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                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                  FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
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     MISTY WHITE, JERMAINE BRADFORD, JANARA )
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     MUSGRAVE, LANDON PROUDFIT, BRADLEY
     BARBER, JR., and DAKOTA KAPPUS, on
 4
     behalf of themselves and all others
     similarly situated; and OKLAHOMA
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     STATE CONFERENCE, NAACP,
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                       Plaintiffs,
 7
        vs.
                                               Case No. 19-CV-1145-JD
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     HON. PAUL HESSE, in his official
     capacity as presiding District Court
     Judge; HON. JACK MCCURDY, in his
     official capacity as District Court
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     Judge; HON. BARBARA HATFIELD, HON.
     CHARLES GASS, HON. KHRISTAN STRUBHAR,
11
     in their official capacities as
     Special District Judges in the
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     Canadian County District Court; and
     CANADIAN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, 26TH
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     JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
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                       Defendants.
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             TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC MOTIONS TO DISMISS
18
                   SEPTEMBER 24, 2021, at 1:00 P.M.
19
       BEFORE THE HONORABLE JODI W. DISHMAN, JUDGE PRESIDING
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23
24
                   Recorded by mechanical stenography
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           Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription
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White, et al. v. Hesse, et al.
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     19-CV-1145-JD * September 24, 2021
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White, et al. v. Hesse, et al. 4 19-CV-1145-JD * September 24, 2021 (Call to Order of the Court.) 1 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. We are here for a 3 telephonic conference in White v. Hesse, Case No. 19-CV-1145. 4 Because this is a telephonic conference, we need to try 5 for only one attorney speaking per side so that we have a clear record. 6 7 I am on the line along with my courtroom deputy, Nyssa 8 Vasquez; and my law clerk, Samuel Merchant; and our court 9 reporter, Cassy Kerr. 10 To have a clear record, anyone speaking should identify 11 themselves before speaking unless I have called on you by name. 12 Given the number of attorneys in this case, I understand that Plaintiffs' counsel will have a primary speaker for this 13 call. Will that attorney please announce an appearance and let 14 15 me know who else is on the line on behalf of the plaintiffs and 16 whether you anticipate anyone else speaking today? 17 MS. TRIGILIO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 18 Trisha Trigilio for the plaintiffs. I'll be speaking this afternoon. Also appearing by phone for the plaintiffs are Zoe 19 20 Brennan-Krohn, Brandon Buskey, Marta Cook, Blake Johnson, and 21 Megan Lambert; and I don't anticipate my cocounsel speaking 22 this afternoon. 23 THE COURT: Thank you, and welcome. 24 Can the counsel for the defendants identify who will be

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speaking and also identify anyone else on the line?

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MS. MOORE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Erin Moore, and I will be the primary speaker, and I do not anticipate anyone else speaking today. Also on the line with me today are Stefanie Lawson and Devan Pederson.

THE COURT: And good afternoon to you all as well.

As set forth in the enter order setting this conference at Docket Number 52, we are here today for a discussion on the complaint, which is filed as a punitive class-action complaint at Docket Number 1; Plaintiffs' motion for class certification at Docket Number 5; Defendant Canadian County District Court, 26th Judicial District's motion to dismiss at Docket Number 35; and Defendant state judges' motion to dismiss at Docket Number 36.

I thought a conference was the most efficient way to deal with the pending issues in this case. I will try to keep this short, and I do not need argument today given how I expect us to work to advance this case in compliance with the Court's and the parties' obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1.

Following this conference, a minute sheet will be issued onto the docket -- and potentially a short order.

As I stated in my order setting this hearing, the goal today is to narrow down or resolve as many things as possible in this case without unnecessary motion practice.

We are on the original complaint, and I do think that the

complaint can be amended to cure some of the raised defects.

Additionally, Plaintiffs have indicated, in at least some of their briefing, that, if I deem the complaint insufficiently clear as to any matters raised in the motions to dismiss, that they have requested an opportunity to amend.

However, before we get into that, I want to give you-all some background on status of things up here at the courthouse, which will hopefully explain in part my desire to get you-all before me this afternoon to move this case forward and hopefully explain some of the delay on my end in reaching your initial pleadings dispute.

As you-all are no doubt aware and as a recent general order in the Eastern District of Oklahoma describes, the Eastern District of Oklahoma is receiving and is going to continue to receive waves of new cases as a result of the McGirt decision. The Eastern District of Oklahoma usually has around 97 criminal cases per year, and it expects to have upwards of 2,500 by the year 2023 as a result of McGirt.

You may be asking, "Why does that impact our case in the Western District?"

Well, that is because the Western District of Oklahoma is assisting in taking hundreds of those cases in addition to our Western District of Oklahoma dockets. As a result, I'm going to need competent counsel in all of my cases, such as those before me this afternoon, to resolve as much as you can by

working professionally and -- by working professionally together and only bring very narrow and legitimate disputes before me.

As you also know, criminal cases get priority over civil cases, and, given the increase in my criminal docket and transferred cases with motions and the ongoing pandemic, it has taken me some time to turn to this case; but, now that I have, my goal, consistent with Rule 1, is to get you-all moving so that we can advance this case.

I'll go ahead and give you-all my tentative conclusion of this hearing now, which I indicated in my order setting this for hearing. I intend to discuss possible deficiencies in the complaint and then give Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint after conferring with the Defendants and addressing my comments and concerns from this call.

I would ask, if you are in a position where you are -where you can take notes, and you are not already taking notes,
that you do so, though the minute sheet from today's conference
will give you any pertinent deadlines.

That first brings me to the complaint. All that Rule 8 requires is a short and plain statement of the claim.

Rule 12(f) provides that I can strike any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Put simply, parties need -- don't need to try their case to the jury or to the public in the pleadings. They can do that on the

dispositive motions or at trial; and, in other instances where I have seen the level of redundancy I see in this complaint, I have stricken the complaint and called for a short and plain statement under Rule 8.

I think the complaint here can be streamlined to include only the allegations that are necessary to state plausible claims for relief, eliminate any evidence or statistics that might not be necessary to allege the claims, and avoid unnecessary repetition. So this would be an area I would expect counsel to address in -- in any amended complaint.

Second, as an overarching comment, I will note that, although I don't want to control, and I don't plan to control, the parties' legal strategies, I have an obligation to manage my docket for the efficient, just, and speedy resolution of disputes. Seeing the likely amendment, this is how I have determined to exercise that discretion and obligation in this case.

I will also note that I am opposed to motions to dismiss just for the sake of filing a motion to dismiss particularly after conferences like these where we try to work through disputes without unnecessary motion practice.

I will tell you that it was my practice before taking the bench that, if I had a basis for a motion to dismiss, I would reach out to confer with opposing counsel. This was particularly so on *Twombly*-type issues where amendment could

cure the issue but also if I thought there was a legal bar or some reason a claim or a party could not assert a claim or be a party in a case.

Here, given the request to amend by Plaintiffs that is noted in one of Plaintiffs' briefs, this is the way I -- I have concluded is necessary to manage this docket and case and to get it moving, particularly with my obligation toward criminal cases following McGirt.

As I walk through the motions to dismiss, to speed things up, I will simply use the case name if I am giving you a case and then provide full case citations in my minute sheet that I will enter after this proceeding.

So, with that overview and now getting to the motions to dismiss, each generally argues, among other things, that the complaint is not clear at times: which plaintiffs assert which claims against which defendants.

About this, I agree. In some claims and allegations, particularly those allegations relating to misconduct or liability, the plaintiffs are lumped together, and, in some, the defendants are lumped together. This is particularly concerning the state judges but applies to all claims and all defendants. This has required the defendants to essentially guess or assume which allegations are asserted against which defendant, which does not satisfy federal pleading standards or directions the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have given

on the plausibility standards under cases like *Twombly*, *Iqbal*, and *Robbins v. Oklahoma* out of the Tenth.

The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a dismissal in Hart, which is a 2015 unpublished case, on a similar basis where the district judge stated that the Court and the parties were left to guess and attempt to parse out which claims relate to which individuals because Plaintiff regularly rotated between references to defendants and individual defendants without making it clear which allegations are directed to which defendant or defendants.

Plaintiffs tried to clean this up in the responses to the motions, but arguments by counsel in a response brief are not allegations in a complaint. I think the complaint must be amended and cleaned up to bring clarity on who is alleged to do what to whom and when before we move forward. This means more precisely targeting a specific plaintiff's allegations against a specific defendant, probably breaking up each defendant into a separate section or grouping them more clearly. Fail —failure to do so might result in dismissal for failure to comply with federal pleading standards if faced with another motion to dismiss.

Next, the motions then state that certain other claims do not have a factual basis and that I should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Iqbal, and Twombly.

About this, at least for some of the claims, I agree.

First, for Plaintiff White and Plaintiff Musgrave's discrimination claims against Canadian County District Court, before a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide an auxiliary aid necessary to afford an individual an equal opportunity to participate in the entity's services, programs, or activities, the entity must have knowledge that the individual is disabled either because that disability is obvious or because the individual or someone else has informed the entity of the disability, and that's a 2007 Tenth Circuit case called Robertson.

For Plaintiffs' accommodation claims, accommodation is only required under the ADA if a public entity has knowledge or it is obvious that the individual requires an accommodation of some kind to participate in or receive the benefits of its services. In addition to *Robertson*, I cite *Ewing v*.

Doubletree, a 2016 unpublished Tenth Circuit case.

Thus, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Canadian County District Court knew either by being informed or because it was obvious that White and Musgrave, number one, had disabilities and, number two, needed accommodations for those disabilities. A general sense of a disability and accommodation is typically not enough, and that comes from Trujillo, which is a District of New Mexico FRD publication case.

The ADA does not require clairvoyance, and that comes from

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Smith v. Midland, which is a Tenth Circuit 1999 case.

Canadian County District Court argues, among other things, that the two claims against it should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Canadian County District Court had knowledge of Plaintiffs' disabilities or knowledge of the need for accommodations.

Plaintiffs respond with what they, quote, "will show," closed quote, but have not plausibly alleged this in the complaint.

I tend to agree with Canadian County: that Plaintiffs have failed to state an ADA or rehabilitation claim in the current complaint. There are no plausible allegations that any named defendant knew about -- or knew about any of White or Musgrave's alleged disabilities or knew that any accommodation was necessary, nor does the current complaint plausibly allege that these alleged disabilities, which are mental disabilities that, according to the complaint, did not physically manifest any perceptible way to the defendants, were obvious to any named defendant.

Although Plaintiffs allege that White informed a nurse and others at the jail, there is no allegation that she informed any of the named defendants of any disability or need for accommodation, nor does the complaint plausibly allege that the jail's knowledge or liability should be imputed to any of the named defendants. With no plausible allegations that any named

defendant knew of a disability or knew of a needed accommodation or that either of those were obvious under Robertson and related cases, the complaint fails to state those claims.

I have located a substantial number of cases dismissing similar claims for similar reasons, some of which I will include in my court minute, for Plaintiffs to take a closer look before they amend this claim or to decide if this is a claim that should not go forward under their Rule 11 obligations.

In summary, I think these claims need to be repled or dropped from the amended complaint if they cannot sufficiently be repled under the case law and statutory standards and under Rule 11 in the applicable rules of professional conduct.

Additionally, on whether Canadian County is a suable entity, Canadian County argues that Canadian County District Court, 26th Judicial District, is not a suable entity, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(B).

Plaintiffs respond that Canadian County District Court is a, quote, "public entity," closed quote, under Title II and the ADA and, therefore, has capacity to be sued.

No party has pointed to binding authority on the issue of whether Canadian County District Court has the capacity to be sued for the ADA and rehabilitation claims.

At least three times, the Western District of Oklahoma has

dismissed Section 1983 claims against Oklahoma state district courts for Plaintiffs' failure to clearly establish that the district courts are suable entities, but this was because only a, quote, "person," closed quote, can be liable under Section 1983. I will cite these authorities in my minute sheet today. They're Agrawal, Harper, and Hines.

Canadian County District Court citations to Martinez v.

Winner and Mason v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District of Kansas

are in opposite because those are both also 1983 cases and do

not support the proposition that Canadian County District Court

is not a suable entity for purposes of the ADA claim or

rehabilitation claim, which are different statutes and do not

require a "person" -- and person in quote -- to be liable.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should look to the ADA and various federal authorities to determine whether Canadian County District Court is a, quote, "public entity," closed quote, but Rule 17(B) seems to provide that the Court should look to the law of the state where the Court is located to determine capacity to be sued.

I am not making any rulings on this issue today, but I have doubts about whether Canadian County District Court is a suable entity. I want the parties to conduct further research, confer about this issue, and exchange that research; and, if Canadian County District Court is still named as a party in the amended complaint, I will need more complete support in any

future filings.

It is the Plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate with certainty that Canadian County District Court is a suable entity, and that proposition comes from the *Hinton* case, which is a 2010 unpublished case.

If another motion to dismiss or briefing needs to be filed on this issue, keep in mind what the Supreme Court has said about precedent and binding law. District court orders, whether from a different judicial district, same judicial district, or even same judge are not precedent and do not create binding law. That comes from a footnote in Camreta v. Greene, which is a Justice Kagan Supreme Court case.

So, to the extent you-all are briefing issues again in this case, I expect statutes, any pertinent regulations and rules, and then binding case law; and, if you cannot find binding case law, keep in mind that it is all persuasive, at that point.

Next, regarding the state judges' motion to dismiss, the response by the plaintiffs focuses on Judge Hesse regarding the bail-setting policy.

I question: Isn't there a distinction between a chief judge and other judges regarding judicial immunity?

The other judges do not create the bail-setting policy and, I would think, would be entitled to judicial immunity on claims regarding the actual enforcement of a policy they did

not create.

I -- I understand the claim that the chief presiding judge is in an administrative capacity when drafting the bail-setting policy, but I think consideration needs to be given that that doesn't apply to all of the judges.

So, if the claims against the other individual judges are going forward, the complaint should be amended to assert specific allegations about specific judges and assert specific claims about specific judges and specify the relief sought from each judge. Right now the complaint combines them all together, which I think is improper and unnecessarily complicates the case because the Court and the defendants have to essentially guess at exactly what relief and claim is sought from each defendant.

Regarding the Sixth Amendment claims, I am going to wait until I see the amended complaint to address the Sixth Amendment claim, but I agree with the defendants: that this could probably be beefed up in an amended complaint.

Next, turning to the NAACP's First Amendment claim, I am not convinced that the NAACP has standing here beyond the other potential issues with the NAACP's claim. As the state judges' motion to dismiss points out at pages 23 and 24, there is no allegation that one of the named defendants disallowed the NAACP member from attending certain proceedings. It notably and repeatedly uses the passive voice when discussing this

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topic. Quote, "The NAACP of Oklahoma's member was denied access and told that arraignments are only held on Tuesdays and Thursdays and that he could not observe them because they are held in judicial chambers," closed quote. That's Docket Number 1, the current complaint, paragraph 101.

There is nothing in the complaint, as it stands, regarding who told the NAACP member this; whether it was even accurate, i.e., whether this is actually the policy; or whether members of the public are plausibly prohibited from viewing initial appearances and arraignments, assuming for today's purposes they have a right to view these; or whether, if I were to grant the relief or remedy requested, it would resolve this claim.

I understand that the response to the motion to dismiss says that some undefined clerk made the statement, but arguments in a response brief are not allegations, and I am required to look only at the allegations in the complaint at the pleading stage; and, even if it was a clerk, I still have the issues I mentioned earlier regarding this person's authority, whether this is an actual prohibition or policy, including whether there are alternatives for public viewing beyond chambers with members of the public during a pandemic.

So the NAACP issue needs to be addressed in the amended complaint; and if, subject to Rule 11 in the applicable rules of professional conduct, the NAACP cannot further support its allegations, it should be removed as a party.

Regarding Younger abstention, unless something drastic changes in the amended complaint, I do not think that Younger abstention applies, so the defendants can drop that issue.

There certainly are other possible issues with the complaint and motions to dismiss, but I do not intend to address every one of them today or give formal rulings, but I think that discussing these with you now can avoid protracted and unnecessary briefing over the pleadings, particularly given the plaintiffs have noted they would seek leave. If I had caught this earlier, I would have ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint in response to the motions to dismiss, but now that you-all have full briefing, you have a good idea of positions and can flush this out so we can move forward.

Rather than dismissing the complaint, I am going to give Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend, as they have requested; and, if they can't cure the deficiencies subject to the applicable rules, then they should drop those allegations or claims and should further support the remaining claims.

I will also state that, for the plaintiffs, the simpler and cleaner you make the complaint, the easier it is for us to move past the pleading stage.

I would like counsel for all parties to review all the briefing, all of their positions, and all of our discussions here today and then have a good faith conference between all

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counsel, which can be in person, by video, or telephonic. 2 by "all counsel," I mean counsel with authority who's

3 responsible for filing motions and amended complaints, which I 4 assume is everyone, but I will let you-all work that out.

The purpose of the conference is to make sure that everyone is on the same page with regard to the claims and defenses and to see what issues in the motions the parties can resolve without unnecessary motion practice. This may ultimately mean each side giving up something and taking something.

Maybe Plaintiffs need to drop a claim or defendant; assert a claim against a different defendant, if they have named the wrong or uncertain individual, entity, or in the wrong capacity; or beef up some of the allegations on certain claims to avoid an unnecessary motion to dismiss.

Maybe the defendants need to simply let weaker arguments go at this stage and focus on stronger ones or simply answer certain claims and move on down the road.

I am not forcing the parties to agree, but I am foreshadowing some of my rulings to save you-all and the Court time and expense, which I think is consistent with all of our obligations under Rule 1 and with my independent duty to manage my cases and dockets.

I think that the plaintiffs likely can state some kind of claim against some of the defendants that gets past the

pleading stage. I expect that the parties will be able to agree on all or at least most of the issues raised in the original motions to dismiss. Even if all issues cannot be resolved, I think you-all can narrow down the issues to one or two narrow issues and only certain defendants.

This process includes the parties conferring in good faith and then Plaintiffs circulating a draft amended complaint with proposed changes; Defendants' counsel reviewing that amended complaint as proposed; the parties conferring again; Plaintiffs revising the proposed draft, if necessary and if they agree, and then filing an amended complaint.

The defendants can answer in full or in part after that or file a much narrower motion to dismiss, if that is absolutely necessary, within the time frame under the federal rules.

As I have intended to caution the parties throughout, please remember that both the complaint and any motions are subject to the federal rules, which includes -- which includes Rule 11, meaning I can sanction parties or counsel for positions that do not meet the requirements of Rule 11.

Also, if it helps you-all, I will let you know, which I do not believe will come as a secret or a surprise -- but, if a position or argument is not expressly supported by a statute or a binding case law, I am generally not inclined to side with such a position. So, to the extent you are reaching on arguments or are relying on nonbinding authorities, I can tell

you now that you may have an uphill battle, and your time and resources may be spent better elsewhere.

Plaintiffs have also filed a motion for class certification at Docket Number 5. I think that this motion is premature given that Plaintiffs are going to amend and that we are not sure which claims we are actually working with regarding which plaintiffs and which defendants. For example, I cannot make conclusions on whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class or whether the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, as required by Rule 23, before I rule on motions to dismiss or before amendment that might resolve some claims.

In these circumstances, I intend to set a class certification briefing schedule after we get through a set of pleadings to work from and, as part of that briefing schedule, would give the plaintiffs a deadline to file their initial motion for class certification.

We will have a conference as needed later in the case with the parties to discuss the class certification motion and briefing. For now, I believe I either need to have Plaintiffs withdraw the motion for class certification to be revised at a later date once we have a final set of pleadings, or I can simply deny or strike that motion now as premature, but I do not want a stale pending motion like that sitting out there on

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the docket, especially one that I know will need to be revised after the pleadings are revised.

Additionally, because I am ordering an amended complaint to be filed by the plaintiffs, I plan to indicate that, given the forthcoming amended complaint, the motions to dismiss are denied without prejudice to resubmission.

I am relatively firm in this plan going forward in this case, but I do want to hear briefly from counsel on what I have discussed today, as well as your timing and what you think you need in terms of timing given I am going to require additional conferences and amendments.

Ms. Trigilio, will you please speak up on behalf of the plaintiffs?

MS. TRIGILIO: Thank you, Your Honor, and -- and -- and I do thank you for that really fulsome explanation of where the Court stands on the motions to dismiss and the potential amendments.

There are two issues that I'd like to follow up on for Plaintiffs. One is with respect to additional allegations that the Court would like to see regarding the Sixth Amendment claim and issues that were raised in the motions to dismiss.

My reading of the motions to dismiss was, on the Sixth

Amendment claim, fully hoping to dismiss for lack of standing,

which is specifically failure to allege an injury in fact, and

our opposition specified that the injury in fact is the

deprivation -- was the deprivation of counsel of the initial bail hearing and that that's fairly traceable to the Defendants' (indiscernible), and, if you only dispute -- or the legal dispute over whether or not the plaintiff had to affirmatively request counsel or, rather -- a bizarre position -- that the right automatically kicked in, in virtue of the fact that there's a criminal prosecution, and counsel is required unless it's validly waived.

So, given that the Sixth Amendment issue is really, from my reading, a legal dispute and not a factual dispute, I'd like a little more clarity on what the Court is looking for in terms of Sixth Amendment allegations.

THE COURT: Okay. And what's your second issue?

MS. TRIGILIO: The second -- thank you, Your Honor.

The second is with respect to the pending class certification motion. The reason that the plaintiffs filed the class certification motion together with the complaint is to preserve the live controversy and preserve this Court's jurisdiction even as the individual class representatives' individual claims were mooted out; and, if that class certification motion is not pending, there's a risk that the entire case could be mooted, and we have to go back and file all over again.

And so I understand that the Court doesn't want the motion sort of hanging out there without a decision. Plaintiffs'

proposal would be to administratively stay that motion and then let the Court schedule for further briefing since we request supplemental briefing on the class certification motion after a class cert discovery has been conducted.

THE COURT: Thank you.

On -- with -- with response to your first question regarding the Sixth Amendment allegations, as I stated in my comments, that was a particular issue that I wanted to see flushed out a bit more in the complaint, more so, I think, with some of my overarching comments about the allegations and -- and being specific as to the specific plaintiff and the specific defendant, but that may be one that certainly has to be flushed out on a motion -- a further motion to dismiss if the parties aren't seeing eye to eye on that one.

So I appreciate you raising that with me, but I think, at this juncture, you know, my general comments apply to the amended complaint as a whole, and that certainly may be a claim, if you-all continue to have disputes over, that I will have to resolve on motion practice.

On your second issue, I would like to hear from the defendants on it, but I -- I -- I think that the proposal that you're making is appropriate, and I -- I would be fine with staying that motion pending a development of these pleadings; and then, once we get past the pleadings stage, we can address where we go from there and how that gets

supplemented so that we're not, you know, looking at many different filings that may cross-reference each other and -- and creating an issue, but I think that's something that we could potentially work through, although I would like to hear from Ms. Moore on that issue.

Ms. Moore?

MS. MOORE: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. TRIGILIO: Your Honor, this is Trisha Trigilio.

I apologize, but, before you turn to Defendants, just on that final note, we'd like to also make it clear that, to the extent that there's an amended complaint -- that the allegations in the amended complaint that will -- will relate back with respect to the -- the class certification motion so that the defendants -- you know, if we go through this procedure, we prefer an agreement among the parties and with the Court that the defendants aren't going to come back and argue that the class certification motion is now moot because we've filed an amended complaint --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TRIGILIO: -- (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Very helpful.

Ms. Moore, what is the defendants' motion on that?

MS. MOORE: Yes, Your Honor. We have no objection to the motion for class certification being stayed and then having the plaintiffs then amend it to be more in line with whatever

the claims are after amendment and any rulings by the Court on any motions to dismiss that might be warranted after amendment. We understand that the complaint, as amended, would relate back to the filing date. So we're not quite sure that there's an issue, but we -- we're in agreement with the -- we can have that stay on file as stayed and to address it under the to-be-determined scheduling order on class certification briefing.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Ms. Moore, from the defendants' perspective?

MS. MOORE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So let me tell you-all what I'm thinking in terms of timing. I believe it's a generous amount of time, but I realize that this is a case with many moving parts and a lot of lawyers involved, and so I want you-all to be able to confer in good faith and have the time to do so, and I know you-all are very busy with other cases as well, and so the time that I've given -- I feel -- I feel it is generous. You-all may tell me it is not, but I will tell you what I'm thinking, and then we can talk about that.

When I -- when I circle back with both counsel, I also want to hear whether, going forward in this case, you desire telephonic proceedings like what we're having this afternoon or whether you would desire in-person proceedings or some combination of the two. I'm certainly aware that we have

counsel out of state, and, given the ongoing pandemic, I want to be sensitive to that. I also, before I took the bench, practiced in other states, and I was always very appreciative when I knew that the judge did not mind if I appeared telephonic.

So I am open to suggestions there, and I will turn back to you-all on that issue, as well as the proposed schedule.

So here is what I plan to propose: that -- and -- and take notes, and then I'll start with Plaintiffs' counsel, then Defendants' counsel, and we can sort through some of these dates if this does not work.

What I would like to propose is that the counsel for the parties confer -- that they're ordered to confer in good faith within 7 days of today's conference regarding the claims in this lawsuit and all arguments asserted in the motions and associated briefs;

that, within 30 days of today, Plaintiffs' counsel shall circulate a proposed amended complaint to Defendants' counsel;

within 45 days of today, counsel for the parties shall confer again regarding the proposed amended complaint in an attempt to resolve any remaining disputes without Court involvement;

within 60 days of today, Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint and are granted leave to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2);

within 60 days of today, Plaintiffs shall file a joint status report updating the Court on the status of the issues raised today and in the motions, including the dates of the conferences, lengths of the conferences, participants, identification of all issues that were resolved at the conferences, and identification of the issues that remain.

Defendants shall respond to any amended complaint within 14 days of service of the amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(3).

And, because I am granting leave for Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, I will deny the motions to dismiss at this time without prejudice to another motion to dismiss, if absolutely necessary, filing -- after the filing of the amended complaint.

And then we will internally calendar in chambers an appropriate time to set up another conference to arrange class briefing likely during a scheduling and status conference; and, that, we would either do in person, by telephone, or a combination, depending on what you-all seek to do in terms of the timing.

So, Ms. Trigilio, let me hear from you first on the -- this time frame.

MS. TRIGILIO: Your Honor, that time frame generally sounds acceptable to Plaintiff.

I do have a -- a personal request for the Court. I'm

actually -- I'm out of the country right now because I'm intending to go on vacation in the next week; and so, if it was possible to extend the deadlines for the initial conference between the parties to 14 days from today's hearing, I would appreciate that just as a -- a personal request.

THE COURT: Okay. And, then, what about going forward in this case in terms of proceedings? What is the Plaintiffs' preference? Is it to be telephonic? Is it to be in person or a combination?

MS. TRIGILIO: I would say a combination, Your Honor. Generally, just for, you know, financial efficiency, we prefer to appear by phone for proceedings that are less important. Perhaps in the future, for something like a dispositive motion, an in-person proceeding would make more sense just so we can --you know, we can communicate more effectively. We'd be open to that, but, generally, phone hearings would be our preference.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Moore, let me hear from you on the time frames that

I've proposed and also on the issue of in-person or telephonic.

MS. MOORE: Yes, Your Honor. We have no problems with the time frames that you've proposed.

We also have no objection to Ms. Trigilio's request of pushing the 7 days out to 14 days.

And we have no problems with telephonic hearings.

THE COURT: Okay. Excellent.

We will go with the 14 days, Ms. Trigilio, and I hope that you are able -- I'm sure it is much awaited time off, so I do hope you are able to enjoy that and not be worried about this case. I know that this process that I'm proposing may seem atypical, but these are extraordinary times at the courthouse, and I feel I'm -- I'm forced to use effective ways to streamline the issues so that we can get and keep cases moving along, though I do think that this direction that I'm giving this case is certainly consistent with Rule 1 and my obligation to manage my own docket.

I will put those time frames in -- the 14 days on the conference, the other dates that are given -- along with some reminders about my expectations that I think I've laid out in today's conference, and that will all be in a -- in a minute sheet -- I don't know how short it will be, so I won't say "short minute sheet" but a minute sheet on the docket that you-all will receive.

Are there any questions about anything before we conclude, or do you need any clarity?

Ms. Trigilio?

MS. TRIGILIO: None, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Moore?

MS. MOORE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you all, and I look forward to moving forward with you-all in this case, and have a great rest

White, et al. v. Hesse, et al. 31 19-CV-1145-JD * September 24, 2021 1 of your Friday and a great weekend. Thank you very much. 2 (The proceedings are concluded at 1:46 p.m.) 3 4 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 5 I, CASSY KERR, Federal Official Court Reporter in and for 6 the United States District Court for the Western District of 7 Oklahoma, do hereby certify that, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code 753, 8 the foregoing is a true and correct transcript Of the 9 stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter, and the transcript page format is in 10 conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference 11 12 of the United States. 13 DATED THIS 9th day of October, 2021. 14 15 /s/Cassy Kerr 16 Cassy Kerr, CSR, CCR, RPR, CRR, CRC, NP-OK Oklahoma CSR License No. 1367 17 Federal Official Court Reporter 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Cassy Kerr, CSR, CCR, RPR, CRC, CRR, U.S. Court Reporter